Joint Statement of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation on Global Strategic Stability

  On the occasion of the victory of World War II and the 80th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations, the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as the "two sides") emphasized the importance of maintaining and consolidating global strategic stability. In view of the severe challenges facing the international community in the field of international and regional security, the two sides followed the important consensus of the two heads of state, reaffirmed their position on the spirit of the signed joint documents on global strategic stability and the principles stated therein, and further stated the following:

  Both sides firmly believe that the people of all countries share the same destiny, and that all countries and organizations cannot guarantee their own security at the expense of other countries. The two sides call on all countries to adhere to the principle of equality and inseparability of global and regional security, make every effort to eliminate conflicts between countries, and jointly build a comprehensive, comprehensive and sustainable security around the world.

  The two sides emphasized the importance of maintaining constructive major power relations in solving global strategic issues. Nuclear-weapon countries bear special responsibilities for international security and global strategic stability. They should abandon Cold War thinking and zero-sum game, and give up taking measures that trigger strategic risks. Concerns should be addressed through equal dialogue and mutual respectful consultation, the level of trust should be enhanced and dangerous misjudgments should be avoided.

  Unfortunately, not all nuclear weapons countries follow the above position. Both sides pointed out with concern that tensions between nuclear-weapon countries have escalated, and even reached the point where they face direct military conflicts. Problems and challenges in the strategic areas have emerged one after another, and the risk of nuclear conflicts has increased.

  The new and old military alliances and alliances are extremely destructive and expanding. Some nuclear-weapon countries have established or expanded permanent military bases in sensitive areas around other nuclear-weapon countries, showing off their military strength, exerting force, or carrying out hostile acts that threaten the core security interests of other countries, have become one of the most urgent strategic risks to be eliminated.

  At the same time, the frontier deployment of military facilities and advanced offensive and defensive weapons has been continuously strengthened. While strengthening anti-missile interception capabilities, it can also be used to perform strategic tasks, especially "decapitation operations", which has aroused serious concerns.

  The plans and actions of certain nuclear-weapon countries to deploy land-based medium- and short-range missiles outside the border are of concern. The relevant missiles have short flight time and wide coverage, and are targeted within other nuclear-weapon countries. At the same time, some military alliances and nuclear-weapon countries and non-nuclear-weapon countries are accelerating the research and development, procurement, and deployment of long-range missiles and similar systems based on the excuses of seeking "deep precise strikes", "kill chains", and "improving counterattack capabilities". Both sides strongly condemn this provocative act that undermines regional stability and global security.

  The "American Golden Dome (formerly 'Iron Dome')" plan announced recently is aiming to build a global, multi-level, multi-field missile defense system that is not subject to any constraints, and to resist various missile threats including "even-match" opponents, which also causes serious damage to strategic stability. The plan completely and completely denies the inseparable principle of maintaining global strategic stability, which is the core principle of maintaining global strategic stability. In addition, the plan also provides further assistance in the research and development of kinetic and non-kinetic means to strike missiles and their supporting facilities and achieve "actively suppressing launches."

  The "US Golden Dome" plan openly proposes to significantly increase outer space combat means, including the research and development and deployment of orbital interception systems, weaponizing outer space and making it an armed confrontation site, which has made the situation worse.

  Both sides oppose the attempts of individual countries to use outer space for armed confrontation, and oppose the development of security policies and activities aimed at gaining military advantages and defining outer space and using them for “war territory.” The two sides advocate that on the basis of the draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Use or Threat of Use of Force on External Space Objects, the Treaty on Preventing the Use of Force on External Space Objects, the Use or Threat of Use of Force on External Space Objects, the provision of fundamental and reliable guarantees to prevent the arms race in outer space, the weaponization of outer space, and to prevent the use of force on external space objects or the use or threat of use of external space objects. In order to maintain world peace, ensure equality and inseparable security among all countries, and improve the predictability and sustainability of countries' exploration and peaceful use of outer space, both sides agree on the implementation of international initiatives/political commitments to not first deploy weapons in outer space on a global scale.

  Both sides condemn the use of commercial space systems to interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign states and intervene in armed conflicts in other countries.

  Certain nuclear-weapon countries have taken provocative actions to pose security threats to other nuclear-weapon countries, especially in the framework of relevant military alliances and alliances, further promote the so-called "extended deterrence" and "nuclear sharing" arrangements, carry out so-called "joint" operations with allies of non-nuclear-weapon countries, use front-line deployment of nuclear weapons and (or) other nuclear weapons, activate the bases within their allies, dual-purpose equipment platforms taken over by allies, and (or) the allies' own conventional forces and equipment, including more advanced missiles and anti-missile weapons, which are very likely to trigger regional and global arms races and push up tensions.

  The two sides specifically pointed out that, based on public announcements made by their owners and judgments based on performance, the above-mentioned offensive capabilities include conventional precision strike weapons and systems that combine nuclear weapons with non-nuclear weapons, aiming at implementing "preventive" and "preemptive" strike missions. Its essence is to use the defensive advantages of the air defense/anti-missile system to implement the first round of strikes in order to seek strategic advantages. At the same time, the risk-taking strategy that combines strike capability and anti-missile capability is directly reflected in the relevant military doctrines, highlighting the comprehensive support for the "missile defense and frustration" capabilities.

  With the support of their allies, some nuclear weapons countries have fully implemented the above ideas and military technical concepts, which is obviously to weaken the reliability and effectiveness of the strategic deterrence of other nuclear weapons countries, and to reveal their attempts to seek overwhelming military advantages, "strategic indestructible" and ultimately achieve "absolute strategic security". This fundamentally violates the basic logic of maintaining strategic balance and runs contrary to the principle of equality and inseparable security. As a result, nuclear-weapon countries and the international community as a whole face multiple threats of direct damage to global strategic stability, increased arms race and increased risks of conflict. In addition, such policies will seriously affect efforts to maintain predictability in the field of nuclear and missiles and make progress in nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament initiatives difficult.

  Both sides have always opposed such policies that undermine global strategic security and stability. The two sides reiterated their adherence to the "Joint Statement of the Leaders of Five Nuclear Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding an Arms Race" issued on January 3, 2022, especially the principle of "Nuclear War cannot be won or won." Both sides call on the participating countries of the above statement to take practical actions and conscientiously implement all clauses. To this end, any military confrontation between nuclear-weapon countries should be resolutely avoided, and a political and diplomatic solution to existing differences should be found on the basis of mutual recognition and respect for each other's security interests and concerns.

  Both sides stressed that to prevent armed conflicts between nuclear-weapon countries and continuously and steadily reduce the cumulative risks of conflict between nuclear-weapon countries - these priority tasks should be implemented equally in a package, with the focus on eliminating the root causes of their basic contradictions and taking into account all the main factors affecting global strategic stability. Both sides firmly believe that taking preventive measures against crises and conflicts should give priority to "control" confrontation and escalation. Only by eliminating the core security interests of certain nuclear-weapon countries on other nuclear-weapon countries can the joint efforts of nuclear-weapon countries to reduce strategic risks be long-lasting and truly effective.

  Both sides reiterated that arms control is an important means to strengthen international security and stability, and that behaviors that undermine international security and stability also hinder efforts in the field of arms control. Both sides are committed to practicing true multilateralism and support the United Nations and its related multilateral mechanisms to play a central role in the arms control process. Both sides believe that in order to reduce the risk of global conflict and ensure global strategic stability, comprehensive efforts should be made, and arms control is one aspect.

  Both sides believe that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation system and is crucial to the global security architecture. The two sides attach great importance to ensuring the integrity, effectiveness and universality of the treaty. They will continue to actively cooperate in the review work to promote the success of the 2026 Review Conference and jointly prevent the treaty from being used for political purposes unrelated to its content.

  The two sides pointed out that through a trilateral security partnership, the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia attempted to build military facilities for the two nuclear-weapon countries to safeguard their nuclear power within a state party to the Treaty on the Nuclear-Free Zone in the South Pacific, undermining regional strategic stability and provoking a regional arms race.

  The two sides also pointed out that further cooperation should be carried out on the military application of artificial intelligence technology within the dual multilateral frameworks such as the "Lawful Autonomous Weapon System" government expert group.

  As the international community commemorates the 50th anniversary of the entry into force of the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons, the two sides reaffirm that the Convention should be fully complied with and urge the State party to continuously strengthen and institutionalize the Convention, especially to reach a legally binding protocol that includes an effective verification mechanism. Both sides expressed concern about the United States and its allies engaging in biological military activities and demanded that they stop engaging in any such activities that threaten the security of other countries and relevant regions at home and abroad.

  The two sides reaffirmed their commitment to establishing a world without chemical weapons and called on the States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to take all necessary measures to achieve the above goals, while restoring the authority of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and promoting their work to return to a technical track of depoliticization. Both sides pointed out that multilateral efforts should be carried out to prevent chemical terrorism and advocated the formulation of the "International Convention on Combating Acts of Biochemical Terrorism" at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. Both sides urge Japan to faithfully fulfill its obligations and completely destroy the abandoned chemical weapons in China as soon as possible. China supports Russia's campaign for the ban on chemical weapons committee members.

  The two sides reaffirmed their compliance with the export control obligations stipulated in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons and Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and opposed individual countries' use of relevant mechanisms for their own selfish interests to curb relevant mechanisms of other countries' technical and economic repression and implement illegal unilateral restrictions. The two sides are committed to promoting the implementation of the UN General Assembly resolution "Promoting the peaceful use of international cooperation in the field of international security."

  Both sides firmly believe that promoting the above work will greatly improve the international security environment and bring significant help to create a good atmosphere conducive to the arms control disarmament process. The arms control disarmament process must follow the principles of "maintaining global strategic stability" and "not reducing the security of all countries".

  The two sides are willing to continue to actively and closely coordinate, deepen pragmatic cooperation, maintain and strengthen global strategic stability, and work together to respond to common challenges and threats in this field.

May 8, 2025 in Moscow

[Editor in charge: Ma Junqing]